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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADMINISTRATORS.
A commission of 4Y2 per cent, allowed an administrator
on personal property amounting to $263,000, will be
reduced to 3 per cent where he had no unusual
services to perform: Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, In re Young's Estate, 53 Atl. 151. Compare In re
Lilly's Estate, 181 Pa. 478.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The decisions seem not to have established clearly the
precise limits of the nature of the possession of woodland
wooded which is sufficient to give title under the statute
t'Am of limitations. The Supreme Court of Illinois,
dealing with this question in Traviers v. McElvain, 65 N. E.
623, holds that for one to blaze out the boundary lines of
part of a large tract of thickly wooded swamp lands, cut
an inconsiderable amount of timber, and at various times
to warn persons seeking to trespass thereon to keep off,
does not constitute possession necessary for title by limita-
tions. See and compare Tucker v. Shaw, 158 Ills. 326.
ANTI-TRUST LAW.
A recent decision of interest in connection with the ques-
tion of anti-trust legislation is the case of Gibbs v. Mc-
Intersute, Neeley, I18 Fed. 120, where it is decided by
Commerce the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Cir-
cuit) that an association of manufacturers of and dealers
in red cedar shingles in the state of Washington, formed
for the purpose of controlling the production and the price
of such shingles, which are made only in that state, but are
principally sold and used in other states; and which, by its
action in closing the mills of its members, has reduced the
production, and has also arbitrarily increased the prices at
which the product is sold, is a combination in restraint of
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interstate commerce, and unlawful under the anti-trust law
of July 2, 189o. See the case of Addyston Pipe and Steel
Co v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
In Cameron v. Boeger, 65 N E. 69o, the Supreme Court
of Illinois holds that an agreement by the complainant that
Dismissing its attorneys shall receive as compensation for
Suit services in a suit a third of whatever is realized
as the result of the litigation, or of any settlement pending
litigation, does not amount to an equitable assignment to
them of any portion of the subject matter of the litigation,
so that they have no interest therein, and no lien for fees,
which will prevent the complainant, without their consent,
from dismissing the suit by stipulation with the defendant.
"Where there is an agreement by a party to pay his attorney
a reasonable compensation for his legal services out of the
proceeds of the litigation, such agreement, depending as it
does upon the mere responsibility of the employer, does not
operate as an equitable assignment of any portion of the
fund sought to be recovered in the suit." But see Patten
v Wilson, 34 Pa. 299.
BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Siupreme Tent
of Knights of Maccabees v. McAllister, 92 N. W. 770, that
Beneficiaries, where two persons are married, and live as
Wife husband and wife till his death, both mistakenly
supposing that she was divorced from her former husband,
she being designated as the wife and beneficiary in his certi-
ficate in a mutual benefit association, is entitled to the insur-
ance, though its by-laws provide that no certificate shall be
made payable to one not a wife, husband, child, dependent,
etc., of the member. Compare Story v. Association, 95
N. Y. 474.
CARRIERS.
Where freight transported over various lines of railway
in a sealed car is injured, it is to be presumed, in the absence
of evidence, that the injury occurred on the last
resumpon line: Cote v. New York, etc., R. Co., 65 N. E.
400. See Moore v. R. R. Co., 173 Mass. 335.
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A passenger bought from a railroad company an excur-
sion ticket at a reduced rate, with an endorsement on it that
Burden of the person accepting it should assume all risk
Proof of accident and damage. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania holds, in Crary v. Lehigh Valley R. R.
Co., 53 Atl. 363, that the acceptance of the ticket was a
waiver of the common-law rule making the carrier liable
for the passenger's safety; and he must affirmatively prove
negligence on the part of the carrier and cannot avail him-
self of the presumption of negligence arising in favor of
the passenger where an injury occurs. See New Jersey
Steam Nay Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344.
CIVIL CONTEMPT.
Proceedings to compel by fine or imprisonment obedience
to an order of the court made in a civil suit to enforce the
Power rights or administer the remedies to which a
of President court of competent jurisdiction decides that a
to Pardon party to the suit is entitled, are not executions of
the criminal laws of the land, but proceedings to secure
suitors in their legal rights, and the president is without
authority, under the grant to him of power to issue reprieves
and pardons for offences against the United States, to relieve
from imprisonment to enforce obedience to, or to pardon
for disobedience of, such an order, because he may not re-
lease or destroy the legal rights or remedies of private citi-
zens: U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit), In
re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448. As to such power in a criminal
case see Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (43).
CODE PLEADING.
In all code states it is provided that if the defendant fails
to raise the question of defect of parties by demurrer or
New answer he waives the objection, and on the
Partes other hand, that at any stage of the proceeding
the court may of its own motion and should bring in any
parties necessary for a complete determination of the case.
These provisions are dealt with by the Court of Appeals of
New York in Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
65 N. E. 281, where it is held that though the defendant
did not raise such objection until at the close of the evidence.
it moved to dismiss the case for such neglect, yet the court
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should have brought in the parties, not for the benefit of
the defendant, but for their own protection. Three judges
dissent and the case presents a good discussion of the sub-
ject. Compare Osterhoudt v. Board, 98 N. Y. 239, 243.
COMPROMISE.
Against the dissent of three judges the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky holds that where the plaintiff sued for per-
Fraud, sonal injuries, admitting that he had received
Tender of payment for his drug bill and loss of time, and
Repayment the defendant pleaded payment in full under a
compromise agreement set forth, a reply that this payment
was the same as that admitted in the petition, and that the
compromise agreement was signed by the plaintiff at a time
when he could not read, and under false representations that
it was a receipt for payment only for drug bill and loss of
time, was not demurrable for failing to tender repayment
of the amount received, though the plaintiff in such action
cannot ordinarily escape such agreement by merely plead-
ing fraud: McGill v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 70 S. W.
lO48. See R. R. Co. v. McElroy, IOO Ky. 153.
CONSIDERATION.
In Thomson v. Thomson, 78 N. Y. Supp. 389, the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third Depart-
Promise to ment) holds that where the plaintiffs, being
Repay money under no obligation to pay the defendant's debt
to a third party, paid the same without the defendant's pre-
vious request, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover on
the defendant's subsequent express promise to reimburse
them for the amount so paid; such promise being without
consideration. See Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The United States Supreme Court holds in Dreyer v.
Illinois, 23 S. C. Rep. 28, that the right to the due process
Indeterminate of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
Sentence, ment to the Federal Constitution is not infringed
Former by the decision of a state court sustaining the
Jeopardy validity of the Illinois indeterminate sentence
act of 1899, under which statute in the case of certain crimes
a convict would be committed for an indefinite time, not to
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
exceed the time fixed by statute. It is so held, though it is
admitted that such statute in effect conferred judicial powers
upon nonjudicial officers, and invested them with the par-
doning power of the executive.
It is further held that a plea of former jeopardy cannot
be based upon the discharge of the jury for their inability to
agree on a verdict after considering the cause from four
o'clock in the afternoon until half past nine in the morning
of the succeeding day. Though this is not a capital case,
the court enters into this question on the ground that pos-
sibly the Fourteenth Amendment may apply the rules ap-
plicable to cases of former jeopardy to all crimes. This,
however, is not decided.
With three judges dissenting the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, holds, in State v. Bengsch, 70 S. W. 710, that a statute
Equal of the state imposing a tax on liquor manu-
Protection of factured for sale within the state, but which
Laws,. does not impose a tax on its manufacture for
export is unconstitutional as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment which guarantees to every citizen of the United
States and of each particular state the equal protection of the
laws.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds, in State v. Ba-
zille, 92 N. W. 415, that the so-called "Inheritance Tax
Inheritance Law" of that state is unconstitutional, because
T- Inequality it operates unequally as between collateral, and
also as between collateral and lineal descendants. Transfers
of property to the former are taxed to the full value, when
such value exceeds $5,ooo, whereas as to lineal descendants
the tax is imposed only upon the excess over and above a
fixed valuation of $5,ooo and this classification the court
refuses to regard as proper. See also Drew v. Tift, 83
N. W. 839.
CONTRACTS.
A debtor had deposited with his creditor certain corporate
bonds to purchase shares of corporate stock held by a third
Consideration, person, or a portion of them, and to sell one-half
Condition of the stock purchased to the debtor, with a
Precedent covenant on the part of the creditor, whereby
he surrendered his absolute right to dispose of his stock,
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and agreed to sell it to the debtor on credit or on joint
account, at the latter's option. Upon these facts the Court
of Appeals of New York holds. against the dissent of two
judges, that failure to purchase all of the stock held by such
third person did not render the agreement unenforceable:
Stokes v. Stokes, 65 N. E. 176
A provision in a contract of sale of a business of manu-
facturing timber and ginning cotton that the seller will not
Restraint of engage in the business in any territory from
Trade, which he secures his patronage ;o as to compete
Indefiniteness with the buyer, is void for indefiniteness as to
territory: Supreme Court of North Carolina in Shute v.
Heath, 42 S. E. 704. See, however, the Alabama case of
Moore & Handley Hardware Co. v. Towers Hardware Co.,
6 South. 43. The court in discussing the question in the
principal case gives a brief but interesting historical account
of the doctrine.
CORPORATIONS.
A party who has entered into a contract for the sale of
real property to a corporation, in reliance whereon the cor-
Estoppel poration has erected valuable improvements on
the property for the purposes of its corporate
business, will not be heard to assert that such property was
not necessary for the business of the corporation: Supreme
Court of Nebraska in Coleridge Creamery Co. v. Jenkins,
92 N. W. 125.
In Dupignac v. Bernstrom, 78 N. Y. Supp. 705, it is
held by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Contract First Department) that where the plaintiff
with agreed with the principal stockholder of the
Stockholders defendant company to render services to the
defendant, and in consideration thereof to receive a certain
per cent of the defendant's surplus earnings after the com-
pany had been placed on a paying basis and rendered solvent,
and such agreement was ratified by the defendant's directors,
and after the company had become solvent a resolution was
passed applying 5 per cent of the net surplus earnings in
payment of the plaintiff's services, the contract was valid,
though the acts done for the corporation were past and had
been done not on its request, but on that of a stockholder.
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Groves v. State, 42 S. E. 755, presents a good discussion of
the difference between the acts which constitute an attempt
Preparation to commit a crime and those which constitute
vs. preparation merely. The Supreme Court of
Attempt Georgia reviews the authorities and approves
the distinction of Chief Justice Field in People v. Murray,
14 Cal. 159, where he says: "Between the preparation for
the attempt, and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference.
The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means
or measures necessary for the commission of the offence.
The attempt is the direct movement towards the com-
mission after the preparations are made."
In State v. Bacon, 70 S. W. 473, it appeared that the
accused was convicted in A. county of embezzling the
identity of proceeds of a draft which had been given him
Offence in B. county, with instruction to. take it to A.
county and cash it. lie had previously been acquitted in B.
county of a charge of embezzling the draft. On these
facts the Supreme Court of Missouri (Division No. 2) holds
that as he was vested with authority to take the draft to A.
county and have it cashed, and in so doing was not guilty
of any crime, but his guilt arose when he converted the pro-
ceeds of the draft to his own use, the former acquittal was
not a bar to the present prosecution.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States'
Constitution, forbidding the taking of property without due
Preventing process of law, a defendant in a suit for separa-
Defence, tion and separate support may not have his
Contempt answer stricken out, and be prevented from pre-
senting a defence, for contempt: New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, First Department) in Sibley v. Sibley,
78 N. Y. Supp. 743. Compare Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U. S.
409.
DEEDS.
In Holt v. Fleischman, 78 N. Y. Supp. 647, it appeared
that the plaintiff's grantor owning several adjoining lots,
Restrictive conveyed a part of the property to the plaintiff
Covenants, under a deed containing a covenant providing
Notice that, on the improvement of her adjoining lots,
the houses erected thereon should be on a line with the fronts
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of the present adjoining houses annexed thereto, which
deed was duly recorded; and the defendant acquired title to
such adjoining property under a deed in partition between
the heirs of such prior grantor. The N. Y Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, First Department) holds that the de-
fendant was bound to take notice of the record of the plain-
tiff - deed, and was therefore bound by the restrictive cove-
nant therein contained, imposing an easement on the adjoin-
ing pr. perty Compare Bradley v Walker. 138 N_ Y. 291.
EASEMENTS.
The owners of land plotted it as a city, laying off streets,
etc., but there was no acceptance of the dedication save such
Opening of as arose from the purchase of lots with refer-
Streets ence to the map. The defendant owning several
lots inclosed them, so as to obstruct certain streets. In
State v. Hamilton, 70 S. W. 619, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee holds that the owner of other lots was not entitled
to have all the streets inclosed by the defendant opened but
only those affording him necessary ingress and egress to
his property. One judge dissents without writing an opin-
ion. Compare Wilson v. Acree, 97 Tenn. 378.
UQUITY
In Sharp v. Behr, II7 Fed. 864, it is held by the U. S.
Circuit Court (E. D., Pennsylvania) that under the law of
Evidence Pennsylvania, the testimony of a wife, support-
to Overcoe= ing that of her husband, to a fact denied by the
Answer answer, is entitled at least to the weight of a
corroborating circumstance, which is sufficient to satisfy the
equitable requirement. See Sower v. Weaver, 78 Pa. 443,
for the former view; and, for later cases in line with the
modem view, which seems not however to have been passed
on by the State Supreme Court, Brenneman v. Rudy, 8 Pa.
Dist. R. 68, and Guernsey v. Fronde, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 405.
A railroad was defendant in several actions for trespass,
the liability in each depending on whether the track had
Jurisaictlon, been properly constructed. The injury com-
Multiplicity plained of was a constantly recurring one, and
of Suits plaintiffs had previously sued for the trespass,
and intended to do so in the future. Under these facts the
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Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that equity has juris-
diction to restrain the actions and consolidate them, to pre-
vent the multiplicity of suits: Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Gar-
ris on, 32 Southern, 996. With this case, compare Tribette
v. Railroad Co., 70 Miss. 182, where the court refuses to
allow the consolidation of the suits.
FIXTURES.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey in Atlantic City
Deposit & Trust Co v. Atlantic City Laundry Co., 53 Atl.
what 2T2, discusses the essential nature of "fixtures,"
Constitutes and summarizes its results by holding that to
transmute chattels into realty, it must appear-first, that
the chattels were actually annexed to the real estate, or
something appurtenant thereto; second, that they were ap-
plied to the use to which' that part of the realty to which
they were connected was appropriated; third, that they
were annexed with the intention to make a permanent ac-
cession to the freehold. Compare Feder v. Van Winkle, 53
N. J. Eq. 370.
INSURANCE.
In New York Life Ins Co. v. Weaver's Adm., 70 S. W.
628, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that where an
Incontestable insurance policy was procured by fraud, the
Policy. fact that by its terms it was incontestable did
Recdssion not preclude the insurance company from re-
scinding it within a reasonable time after discovering the
fraud on surrendering the premiums received. But where
an incontestable insurance policy was procured by fraud,
and the company did not elect to rescind the same during the
life of the insured, and on her death, under an impression
that it could not defend an action on the policy, paid the
same, it was not entitled to maintain an action against the
assured's administrator for deceit to recover the amount of
the policy paid and for other damages.
INT RSTATE COMMERCE LAW.
The U. S. Circuit Court (W. D., Virginia) holds in
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry Co., 117
Mscimination Fed. 741, that competition which is real and
in Rates substantial, and exercises a potential influence
on rates to a particular point, brings into play the dissimi-
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larity of circumstance and condition provided for by the
interstate commerce act, and may justify a lesser charge
for the longer than the shorter haul. The making of a
lesser rate to a more distant and competitive point than is
charged to a nearer non-competitive point is not, it is said,
an unjust discrimination against the nearer point nor does
it give an undue preference to the more distant point, in
violation of the interstate commerce act, where said rate is
induced by real and substantial competition. The court
goes one step further and holds that the fact that a railt,,ad
company has acquired the ownership of the only road which
previously competed with its own for business at a certain
point cannot affect the question whether its rates unjustly
discriminate against such point in favor of another point
where competition exists, where it affirmatively appears
that the rates to the non-competitive point have not been
increased since the purchase of the competing road. See
also East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 181 U. S. 18.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
A tenant slipped on ice formed in a hallway in the leased
building the night before, and was injured, The ice was
Defective formed from water dripping from a defective
Premises closet, which defect had existed for some days,
with the knowledge of the janitor of the building. Under
these facts the N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Second Department) holds that the liability of the landlord
was determinable by the diligence required in removing the
defect in the closet, not by the diligence required in remov-
ing the ice: Hoag v. Williamsburgh Say. Bank, 78 N. Y.
Supp. 141.
LATERAL SUPPORT.
While in this country it is well-settled that an adjoining
landowner is responsible to his neighbor for injuries to his
excavatons, buildings in consequence of excavations, when
Notice negligence on his part in making such excava-
tions can be shown, it is not so clear what constitutes such
negligence. In Davis v. Summerfield, 42 S. E. 818, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that an owner of
land who excavates by the side of his neighbor's wall to a
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depth lower than the foundation of the wall, is negligent
for failing to notify the neighbor of the extent of his pro-
posed plans, though the neighbor knew that he was going
to excavate, and is liable for injuries to the wall caused by
his excavations.
LIMITATIONS.
In Newberger v. Wells, 42 S. E. 625, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia holds that the defence of the
Pleading, statute of limitations need not in all cases be
Demurrer specially pleaded, but that where a bill in equity
discloses on its face laches, or the facts alleged show that the
cause of action is within the statute of limitations, the bill is
for that reason demurrable, unless sufficient facts are set
forth in it to avoid laches or to take the case out of the stat-
ute. See and compare Vanbibber v. Beirne, 6 W. Va. 168.
PARTIES.
In Howe v. Mittelberg, 70 S. W. 396, the Court of
Appeals at St. Louis, Missouri, holds that a person to whom
Code a chose in action has been assigned for collection
Practice is the trustee of an express trust, and, as such,
may sue on the assigned demand in his own name.
STATUTZ OF FRAUDS.
A contract whereby an oil company is to furnish oil to a
merchant on certain terms for five years or so long as he
Time of should remain in business, is not within the
Performance statute of frauds, as it might have.been per-
formed within less than one year: Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in Standard Oil Co. v. Denton, 70 S. W. 282.
SUBROGATION.
Land devised to a wife was subject to a debt of the tes-
tator, and in order to pay this off she executed a note to a
Advance to third party and her husband signed and ac-
Discharge knowledged a mortgage on the land as security.
Incunbrance The third party indorsed the note and gave it
to the husband, who indorsed it to a bank, giving his own
note as additional collateral, thereby obtaining the necessary
money. On these facts it is held by the Court of Appeals
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of Kentucky in State Nat. Bank of Maysville v. Vicroy, 70
S. W. 183, that, if the mortgage was invalid on account
of the wife's coverture the bank would be remitted to the
lien on the land which its money was used to discharge. See
also Kelley v. Ball, (Ky.) 19 S. W. 581.
SUBTERRANRAN WATURS
The Supreme Court of California holds in Katz v. Walk-
inshaw, 70 Pac. 663, that where subterranean waters were
Rights of not shown to exist in the form of a stream, but
Landowner consisted of water percolating through a large
area of porous soil, with no regular stratification, still the
right of a landowner to use subterranean percolating waters,
and divert the same from the land of an adjoining land-
owner, is limited to a reasonable use in connection with the
use of his own land, and does not authorize him to appro-
priate such waters by artesian wells, and sell the same for
the irrigation of distant lands, to the detriment of adjoin-
ing landowners. The case presents an excellent review of
the authorities, and in applying the principle long ago set-
tled in regard to the rights of a riparian owner to the case of
underground percolating water reaches a conclusion more
satisfactory than the old cases. See Bassett v. Mfg. Co., 43
N. H. 569.
VERDICT.
While it is well settled that a juror has no right to state
to his fellow jurors, matters relevant to the case in hand,
!ipeachunent the Supreme Court of Texas holds in St. Louis
by Jurors S. W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Ricketts, 70 S. W.
315, that affidavits of jurors that, pending their deliberation,
the foreman stated that he was familiar with the defend-
ant's depot at the place in question, and that it was uni-
formly not heated, which was a material issue in the case;
were inadmissible to impeach their verdict for the plaintiff.
